North Korea and weapons of mass destruction

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North Korea claims to possess nuclear weapons, and is widely believed to have a substantial arsenal of chemical weapons, deliverable by artillery against South Korea.

1 North Korea's perspective
2 Plutonium
3 Enriched uranium
4 Delivery systems
5 Biological and chemical weapons
6 Diplomatic relations of USA with North Korea
- 6.1 Chronology of events
7 See also
8 External links

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North Korea's perspective

Korea has been a divided country since 1948, and North Korea and South Korea are still officially at war. The deployment of the U.S. Army's Second Infantry Division on the Korean peninsula and the American military presence at the Korean Demilitarized Zone are publicly regarded by North Korea as an occupying army.

The U.S. has rejected recent North Korean calls for bilateral talks concerning non-aggression pact, insisting that only six-party talks that also include the People's Republic of China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea are acceptable.

A document leaked in March 2001 showed that the U.S. Government was willing to use nuclear weapons against North Korea. North Korea argues that its nuclear-weapons program is no more than a valuable deterrent against aggression by the U.S.

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Plutonium

Concern focuses around two reactors at Yongbyon, both of them small power stations using Magnox technology. The smaller (5MWe) was completed in 1986 and has since produced possibly 8,000 spent fuel elements. Construction of the larger plant (50MWe) commenced in 1984 but in 2003 was still incomplete. This larger plant is based on the declassified blueprints of the Calder Hall power reactors used to produce plutonium for the UK nuclear weapons program.

It has also been suggested that small amounts of plutonium could have been produced in a Russian-supplied IRT-2000 heavy-water moderated research reactor completed in 1967, but there are no recorded safeguards violations with respect to this plant.

On March 12, 1993, North Korea said that it planned to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and refused to allow inspectors access to its nuclear sites. By 1994, the United States believed that North Korea had enough reprocessed plutonium to produce about 10 bombs with the amount of plutonium increasing. Faced with diplomatic pressure and the threat of American military airstrikes against the reactor, North Korea agreed to dismantle its plutonium program as part of the Agreed Framework in which South Korea and the United States would provide North Korea with light water reactors and fuel oil until those reactors could be completed. Because the light water reactors would require enriched uranium to be imported from outside North Korea, the amount of reactor fuel and waste could be more easily tracked making it more difficult to divert nuclear waste to be reprocessed into plutonium.

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Enriched uranium

However, with the abandonment of its plutonium program, North Korea secretly began an enriched uranium program. Pakistan, through Abdul Qadeer Khan, supplied key technology and information to North Korea in exchange for missile technology around 1997, according to U.S. intelligence officials.

This program was publicized in October 2002 when the United States asked North Korean officials about the program, and, according to the U.S., North Korea admitted the existence of the program [1]. According to North Korea, it replied that it is "entitled" to have such a program or "an even more powerful one" to deter a pre-emptive U.S. attack, unless the U.S. agreed to a non-agression pact. (see below)

Although the Agreed Framwork specifically prohibited then-existing plutonium programs, not uranium, the U.S. argued North Korea violated the "spirit" of the agreement. In December 2002, the United States terminated the 1994 Agreed Framework, suspending fuel oil shipments.

North Korea responded by announcing plans to reactivate a dormant nuclear fuel processing program and power plant north of Pyongyang. North Korea soon thereafter expelled U.N. inspectors and withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

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Delivery systems

North Korea's ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction to a hypothetical target is somewhat limited by its missile technology. As of 2005, North Korea total range with its No Dong missiles is only 1,300 km, enough to reach South Korea, Japan, and parts of China and Russia, but not to the United States or Europe. It is not known if this missile is actually capable of carrying the nuclear weapons Korea has so far developed. They have also developed the Taepo Dong 1 missile, which has a range of 2,000 km, but it is not yet in full deployment. With the development of the Taepo Dong 2 missile, with an expected range of 5,000-6,000 km, North Korea could hypothetically deliver a warhead to almost all countries in South East Asia, and parts of Alaska. CIA director George Tenet has claimed that the Taepo Dong 2 could deliver a small payload even to the western parts of the Lower 48 states of the U.S., though with low accuracy [2].

Since North Korea could be seen as a threat to the region, the U.S. established the "Six Party Talks", inviting North Korea to join the United States, Russia, Japan, China and South Korea.

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Biological and chemical weapons

North Korea is widely believed to possess a substantial arsenal of chemical weapons. It reportedly acquired the technology necessary to produce tabun and mustard gas as early as the 1950s, and now possesses a full arsenal of nerve agent and other advanced varieties, and has developed the means to launch them in artillery shells. North Korea has a large artillery arsenal within range of Seoul, South Korea's capital, and a chemical attack could cause a very large number of casualties. This threat is, until the development of nuclear weapons, the North's most potent insurance against an attack from the South.

North Korea has expended considerable resources on equipping its army with chemical-protection equipment.

North Korea acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987, the Geneva Protocol on January 4, 1989, but has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention.

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Diplomatic relations of USA with North Korea

Main article: U.S.-North Korea relations

Even though U.S. President George W. Bush had named North Korea as part of an "Axis of Evil" following the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks, U.S. officials stated that the United States was not planning any immediate military action.

Diplomatic efforts at resolving the North Korean situation are complicated by the different goals and interests of the nations of the region. While none of the parties desire a North Korea with nuclear weapons, South Korea and Japan are very concerned about North Korean counterstrikes in case of military action against North Korea. The People's Republic of China and South Korea are also very worried about the economic and social consequences should this situation cause the North Korean government to collapse.

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Chronology of events

On October 12, 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the "Agreed Framework": North Korea agreed to freeze its plutonium production program in exchange for fuel oil, economic cooperation, and the construction of two modern light-water nuclear power plants. Eventually, North Korea's existing nuclear facilities were to be dismantled, and the spent reactor fuel taken out of the country. All of the operative provisions of the accord relate to freezing the North's plutonium program and make no reference to uranium enrichment. Pyongyang scrupulously observed these provisions until the Bush administration stopped the oil shipments in December 2002. [3]

By October 1997, the spent fuel rods were encased in steel containers, under IAEA inspection. [4]

In October 2002 the United States confronted North Korea with the claim that it knew the North was developing gas centrifuge technology to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, and threatened to terminate the Agreed Framework. According to the U.S., North Korea confirmed its uranium program; according to North Korea, it replied that it is "entitled" to have such a program or "an even more powerful one" to deter a pre-emptive U.S. attack, unless the U.S. agreed to a non-agression pact. [5] [6]

In December 2002, the United States took the first step to terminate the Agreed Framework, suspending fuel oil shipments, arguing North Korea's uranium program violated the "spirit" of the agreement. North Korea responded by announcing it would restart plutonium production and repeating its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. [7]

On January 10, 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In late January 2003, Japan Defense Agency Director Shigeru Ishiba told reporters that if North Korea "begins preparations to attack [Japan], for instance by fueling its missiles, we will consider North Korea is initiating a military attack" and pre-emptively strike missile bases in DPRK. [8]

The United States stated on February 26, 2003 that North Korea had reactivated a reactor at its main nuclear complex.

North Korean fighter aircraft intercepted and may have targeted a United States reconnaissance aircraft over International Waters in the Sea of Japan (East Sea of Korea) on March 2, 2003, the first such interception since 1969.

On April 24, 2003, the United States, People's Republic of China, and North Korea met in Beijing for trilateral discussions. The United States threatened sanctions against North Korea, which North Korea has said would constitute a "declaration of war."

On May 12, 2003, North Korea declared the 1992 accord with South Korea nullified, which agreed to keep the Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons, citing U.S. hostility as a threat to its sovereignty. [9] South Korea considers the accord in effect.

On August 28, 2003, North Korea announced that it is in possession of nuclear weapons, has the means to deliver them, and will soon be carrying out a nuclear test to demonstrate this capability.

On September 28, 2004, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su-hon told the UN General Assembly that "hostile policy" of the United States was responsible for the nuclear standoff. At a news conference after his address, Choe said his country had converted 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods into weapons.[10]

North Korea announced on February 10, 2005 that it had developed nuclear weapons for its self-defense, and suspended participation in the Six-party talks.

In early May 2005 American claimed satellite imagery showed possible preparations for a nuclear test, with holes being dug and then filled and a "reviewing stand" built several miles from the site. [11]

On September 19, 2005, Six-party talks resulted in an agreement where North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons program for economic cooperation and assistance, repeating its right to "peaceful uses of nuclear energy," while the U.S. recognized North Korea's sovereignty and stated that it had no intention to attack North Korea. The provision of a nuclear light-water reactor would be discussed at "an appropriate time"; the U.S. and North Korea immediately disagreed on when that should be. [12]

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