U.S. invasion of Afghanistan
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The United States invasion of Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom1) occurred in October 2001, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S., marking the beginning of its "War on Terrorism" campaign. Seeking to oust the Taliban and find Al-Qaeda mastermind Osama bin Laden, the Afghan Northern Alliance provided the majority of forces, and the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada provided support.
The officially-stated purpose of the invasion was to target al-Qaeda members, and to punish the Taliban government in Afghanistan which had provided support and haven to al-Qaeda.
Background
Since approximately 1996, Osama bin Laden had been resident in Afghanistan along with other members of al-Qaeda, operating terrorist training camps in a loose alliance with the Taliban. Following the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Africa, the Clinton administration fired cruise missiles at these camps with limited effect on their overall operations. After the September 11th attacks, investigators rapidly accumulated evidence implicating bin Laden.
In the weeks prior to the military action in Afghanistan, US President George W. Bush delivered an ultimatum [1] to the Taliban, to:
- deliver Al-Qaeda leaders located in Afghanistan to the United States
- release all imprisoned foreign nationals, including American citizens [2]
- protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in Afghanistan
- close terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and "hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities".
- give the US full access to terrorist training camps to verify their closure
President Bush further stated that the demands were not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban refused to directly speak to Bush, stating this would be an insult to Islam, but made statements through their Pakistan embassy. Their initial response was to demand evidence of bin Laden's culpability in the September 11th attacks and to offer to try him in an Islamic court. Later, as the likelihood of military action became more imminent, they offered to extradite bin Laden to a neutral nation. Moderates within the Taliban allegedly met with American embassy officials in Pakistan in mid-October, in order to work out a way to convince Mullah Muhammed Omar to turn bin Laden over to the U.S. and avoid the impending retaliation from the United States. President Bush rejected these offers made by the Taliban as insincere.
The UN Security Council also issued a resolution on September 18, 2001 directed towards the Taliban demanding that they hand over the terrorist Osama bin Laden and close all terrorist training camps immediately and unconditionally. The council also referred to a resolution it adopted in December 2000 demanding that the Taliban turn over bin Laden to the United States or a third country for trial in the deadly bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa in August 1998.
Military operations
Initial attack
Prior to October 7, U.S. and British Special Forces clandestinely infiltrated Afghanistan to make contact with the Northern Alliance to organize those forces to over throw the Taliban. There were explosions in Kabul within a day of September 11, although these were minor rocket attacks by the Northern Alliance.
At approximately 16:30 UTC (12:30 EDT, 21:00 local time) on Sunday October 7, 2001, US and British forces began an aerial bombing campaign targeting Taliban forces and al-Qaeda. Strikes were reported in the capital, Kabul (where electricity supplies were severed), at the airport and military nerve-centre of Kandahar (home of the Taliban's Supreme Leader Mullah Omar), and also in the city of Jalalabad (military/terrorist training camps). The US government justified these attacks as a response to the September 11, 2001 attacks and the failure of the Taliban to meet any US demands. The Taliban condemned these attacks and called them an "attack on Islam."
At 17:00 UTC, Bush confirmed the strikes on national television and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair also addressed the UK. Bush stated that at the same time as Taliban military and terrorists' training grounds would be targeted, food, medicine, and supplies would be dropped to "the starving and suffering men, women and children of Afghanistan." [3]. These drops came under criticism for having the same color as the cluster bombs that the United States was using.
A number of different technologies were employed in the strike. Air Force general Richard Myers, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that approximately 50 Tomahawk cruise missiles, launched by British and US submarines and ships, 15 strike aircraft from carriers and 25 bombers, such as B-1 Lancer, B-2 Spirit, B-52 Stratofortress and F-16 Fighting Falcon were involved in the first wave. Two C-17 Globemaster transport jets were to deliver 37,500 daily rations by airdrop to refugees inside Afghanistan on the first day of the attack.
A pre-recorded video tape of Osama bin Laden had been released before the attack in which he condemned any attacks against Afghanistan. Al-Jazeera, the Arabic satellite news channel, claimed that these tapes were received shortly before the attack. In this recording bin Laden claimed that the United States would fail in Afghanistan and then collapse, just as the Soviet Union did, and called for a war of Muslims, a Jihad, against the entire non-Muslim world.
Taliban retreat
Initial air campaigns
Bombers operating at high altitudes well out of range of anti-aircraft fire began bombarding al-Qaeda training camps and Taliban air defenses. During the initial build-up before the actual attack, there had been speculation in the media that the Taliban might try to use U.S.-built Stinger anti-air missiles that were the bane of Soviet helicopters during the Soviet occupation in the 80's. If any of these missiles existed at the time of the air campaign, they were never used and the U.S. never lost a single aircraft to enemy fire. Beyond that, the Taliban had little to offer in the way of anti-aircraft weaponry, relying mostly on left-over arms and weapons from the Soviet invasion. U.S. aircraft, including Apache helicopter gunships, operated with impunity throughout the campaign. Around 50 Tomahawk cruise missiles were also used. The strikes initially focused on the area in and around the cities of Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. Within a few days, most al-Qaeda training sites had been severely damaged and the Taliban's air defenses had been destroyed. The campaign then focused on communications and "command and control". The Taliban began losing the ability to coordinate, and their morale began to sink. But the line facing the Northern Alliance held, and no tangible battlefield successes had yet occurred. Two weeks into the campaign, the Northern Alliance, not seeing a breakthrough, demanded the bombing focus more on the front lines. Critics began to see the war losing its way. Civilian casualties also began to mount. Several Red Cross warehouses were bombed. Meanwhile, thousands of Pashtun militiamen from Pakistan poured into the country, joining the fight against the U.S. led forces.
The next stage of the campaign began. Hornet bombers hit Taliban vehicles in pinprick strikes, while U.S. planes began cluster bombing Taliban defenses. However, for the first time, Northern Alliance commanders began seeing results. The Taliban support structure was beginning to erode under the pressure of the strikes. Then, for the first time, U.S. Special Forces launched an audacious raid deep into the Taliban's heartland of Kandahar, even striking one of Mullah Omar's compounds. However, the campaign's progress seemed to remain very slow. The last week of October had ended, and it was now the beginning of November.
At this time, the next stage of the air campaign began to fulfill long-awaited Northern Alliance expectations. The Taliban front lines were bombed with 15,000-pound daisy cutter bombs, and by AC-130 gunships. Poor Taliban tactics increased the effect of the strikes. The fighters had no previous experience with American firepower, and often even stood on top of bare ridgelines where Special Forces could easily spot them and call in air attacks. By November 2, Taliban frontal positions were decimated, and a Northern Alliance march on Kabul seemed possible for the first time. Many Afghan Taliban troops had terrible morale, and were regarded as untrustworthy. Foreign fighters from al-Qaeda took over security in the Afghan cities, demonstrating how unstable the regime had become. Meanwhile, the Northern Alliance and their CIA/Special Forces advisors planned the offensive. Northern Alliance troops would seize Mazar-I-Sharif, thereby cutting off Taliban supply lines and enabling the flow of equipment from the countries to the north, followed by an attack on Kabul itself.
Land advances: Mazar-e-Sharif
On November 9, 2001, the battle for Mazar-e-Sharif began. U.S. bombers carpet-bombed Taliban defenders concentrated in the Chesmay-e-Safa gorge that marks the entrance to the city. At 2 P.M, Northern Alliance forces then swept in from the south and west, seizing the city's main military base and airport. The forces then mopped up the remnants of the Taliban in the gorge in front of the city, meeting only feeble resistance. Within 4 hours, the battle was over. By sunset, what remained of the Taliban was retreating to the south and east. Mazar-e-Sharif was taken. The next day, Northern Alliance forces seeking retribution combed the city, shooting suspected Taliban supporters in on-the-spot executions. 520 young Taliban, demoralized and defeated, many of whom were from the fighters that crossed from Pakistan, were massacred when they were discovered hiding in a school. Looting was rampant.
The same day the massacres of former Taliban supporters was taking place in Mazar-e-Sharif, November 10, Northern Alliance forces swept through five northern provinces in a rapid advance. The fall of Mazar-e-Sharif had triggered a complete collapse of Taliban positions. Many local commanders switched sides rather than fight. The regime was beginning to unravel at the seams throughout the north. Even in the south, their hold on power seemed tenuous at best. The religious police stopped their regular patrols. A complete implosion of the Taliban regime seemed imminent.
The fall of Kabul
Finally, on the night of November 12, Taliban forces fled from the city of Kabul, sneaking away under cover of darkness in a massive retreat. By the time Northern Alliance forces arrived in the afternoon of November 13, only bomb craters, burned foliage, and the burnt out shells of Taliban gun emplacements and positions were there to greet them. A small group of perhaps twenty devoted Arab fighters hiding in the city's park were the only defenders left. After a brief 15-minute gun battle, all of the foreign al-Qaeda fighters were dead, having had little more than some scrub to shield them. Kabul had fallen.
The fall of Kabul marked the beginning of a collapse of Taliban positions across the map. Within 24 hours, all of the Afghan provinces along the Iranian border, including the key city of Herat, had fallen. Local Pashtun commanders had taken over throughout northeastern Afghanistan, including the key city of Jalalabad. Taliban holdouts in the north, comprised of mainly Pakistani volunteers, fled to the northern city of Konduz to make a stand. By November 16, the Taliban's last stronghold in northern Afghanistan was besieged by the Northern Alliance. Nearly 10,000 Taliban fighters, led by foreign fighters, refused to surrender and continued to put up stubborn resistance. By then, the Taliban had retreated back to their heartland in southeastern Afghanistan around Kandahar, and even their hold there was tenuous at best. The regime seemed to be teetering on the brink of annihilation.
By November 13, al-Qaeda forces, almost certainly with Osama bin Laden himself, had regrouped and were concentrating their forces in the Tora Bora cave complex, 30 miles (50 km) southeast of Jalalabad, to prepare for a stand against the anti-Taliban and American forces. Nearly 2000 al-Qaeda fighters fortified themselves in positions within bunkers and caves, and by November 16, U.S. bombers began stepped up pummeling of the mountain fortress. Around the same time, CIA and Special Forces operatives were already at work in the area, enlisting and paying local warlords to join the fight and planning an attack on the al-Qaeda base.
Just as the bombardment at Tora Bora was stepped up, the bloody siege of Konduz that began on November 16 was continuing. Finally, after 9 days of heavy fighting and blistering American bombardment, Taliban fighters surrendered to Northern Alliance forces on November 25.
Consolidation: the taking of Konduz and Kandahar
On November 25, the day that Taliban fighters holding out in Konduz finally surrendered and were being herded into the Qala-e-Jangi prison complex near Mazar-I-Sharif, a few foreign Taliban attacked some Northern Alliance guards, taking their weapons and opening fire. This incident soon triggered a widespread revolt by 600 detained fighters at the prison, who began grabbing AK-47s, machine guns, and grenades and attacking Northern Alliance troops. One American CIA operative who had been interviewing prisoners, Mike Spann, was killed, marking the first American combat death in the war. The fighters soon seized the southern half of the complex, once a medieval fortress. The revolt was finally put down after three days of heavy strafing fire by AC-130 gunships and Black Hawk helicopters. Less than 100 of the several hundred Taliban prisoners survived, and around 50 Northern Alliance soldiers were killed. The quashing of the revolt marked the end of the combat in northern Afghanistan, where local Northern Alliance warlords were now firmly in control.
By the end of November, Kandahar, the movement's birthplace, was the last remaining Taliban stronghold and was coming under increasing pressure. Nearly 3,000 tribal fighters, led by Hamid Karzai, a Westernized and polished loyalist of the former Afghan king, and Gul Agha, the governor of Kandahar before the Taliban seized power, put pressure on Taliban forces from the east and cut off the northern Taliban supply lines to Kandahar. The threat of the Northern Alliance loomed in the north and northeast. Meanwhile, the first significant U.S. combat troops had arrived. Nearly 1,000 Marines, ferried in by Chinook helicopters, set up a Forward Operating Base in the desert south of Kandahar on November 25. The first significant combat involving U.S. ground forces occurred a day later when 15 armored vehicles approached the base and were attacked by helicopter gunships, destroying many of them. Meanwhile, the airstrikes continued to pound Taliban positions inside the city, where Mullah Omar was holed up. Omar, the Taliban leader, remained defiant despite the fact that his movement only controlled 4 out of the 30 Afghan provinces by the end of November and called on his forces to fight to the death.
As the Taliban teetered on the brink of losing their last bastion, the U.S. focus increased on the Tora Bora cave complex. Local tribal militias, numbering over 2,000 strong and paid and organized by Special Forces and CIA paramilitaries, continued to mass for an attack as heavy bombing continued of suspected al-Qaeda positions. 100-200 civilians were reported killed when 25 bombs struck a village at the foot of the Tora Bora and White Mountains region. On December 2, a group of 20 U.S. commandos was inserted by helicopter to support the operation. On December 5, Afghan militia wrested control of the low ground below the mountain caves from al-Qaeda fighters and set up tank positions to blast enemy forces. The al-Qaeda fighters, mostly composed of Arabs, withdrew with mortars, rocket launchers, and assault rifles to higher fortified positions and dug in for the battle.
By December 6, Omar finally began to signal that he was ready to surrender Kandahar to tribal forces. His forces broken by heavy U.S. bombing and living constantly on the run within Kandahar to prevent himself from becoming a target, even Mullah Omar's morale lagged. Recognizing that he could not hold on to Kandahar much longer, he began signaling a willingness in negotiations to turn the city over to the tribal leaders, assuming that he and his top men received some protection. The U.S. government rejected any amnesty for Omar or any Taliban leaders. On December 7, Mullah Mohammad Omar slipped out of the city of Kandahar with a group of his hardcore loyalists and moved northwest into the mountains of Uruzgan province, reneging on the Taliban's promise to surrender their fighters and their weapons. He was last reported seen driving off with a group of his fighters on a convoy of motorcycles. Other members of the Taliban leadership fled into Pakistan through the remote passes of Paktia and Paktika provinces. However, Kandahar, the last Taliban-controlled city, had fallen, and the majority of the Taliban fighters had disbanded. The border town of Spin Boldak was surrendered on the same day, marking the end of Taliban control in Afghanistan. The Afghan tribal forces under Gul Agha seized the city of Kandahar while the Marines took control of the airport outside and established a U.S. base.
The Battle of Tora Bora: endgame deferred
The foreign al-Qaeda fighters were still holding out in the mountains of Tora Bora, however. Anti-Taliban tribal militia continued a steady advance through the difficult terrain, backed by withering air strikes guided in by U.S. Special Forces. Facing defeat and reluctant to fight fellow Muslims, the al-Qaeda forces agreed to a truce to give them time to surrender their weapons. In retrospect, however, many believe that the truce was a ruse to allow important al-Qaeda figures, including Osama bin Laden, to escape. On December 12, the fighting flared again, probably initiated by a rear guard buying time for the main force's escape through the White Mountains into the tribal areas of Pakistan. Once again, tribal forces backed by U.S. special operations troops and air support pressed ahead against fortified al-Qaeda positions in caves and bunkers scattered throughout the mountainous region. By December 17, the last cave complex had been taken and their defenders overrun. A search of the area by U.S. forces continued into January, but no sign of bin Laden or the al-Qaeda leadership emerged. It is almost unanimously believed that they had already slipped away into the tribal areas of Pakistan to the south and east. It is estimated that around 200 of the foreign jihadis were killed during the battle, along with an unknown number of anti-Taliban tribal fighters. No U.S. deaths were reported.
Following Tora Bora, U.S. forces and their Afghan allies consolidated their position in the country. Following a loya jirga or grand council of major Afghan factions, tribal leaders, and former exiles, an interim Afghan government was established in Kabul under Hamid Karzai. U.S. forces established their main base at Bagram airbase just north of Kabul. Kandahar airport also became an important U.S. base area. Several outposts were established in eastern provinces to hunt for Taliban and al-Qaeda fugitives. The number of U.S-led coalition troops operating in the country would eventually grow to over 10,000. Meanwhile, the Taliban and al-Qaeda had not yet given up. Al-Qaeda forces began regrouping in the Shahi-Kot mountains of Paktia province throughout January and February of 2002. A Taliban fugitive in Paktia province, Mullah Saifur Rehman, also began reconstituting some of his militia forces in support of the foreign fighters. They totalled over 1,000 by the beginning of March of 2002. The intention of the rebels was to use the region as a base area for launching guerilla attacks and possibly a major offensive in the style of the mujahedin who battled Soviet forces during the 1980s.
Operation Anaconda
U.S. and allied Afghan militia intelligence sources soon picked up on this buildup in Paktia province and prepared a massive push to counter it. On March 2, 2002, U.S. and Afghan forces launched an offensive on al-Qaeda and Taliban forces entrenched in the mountains of Shahi-Kot southeast of Gardez. The rebel forces, who used small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars, were entrenched into caves and bunkers in the hillsides at an altitude that was largely above 10,000 feet (3,000 m). They used "hit and run" tactics, opening fire on the U.S. and Afghan forces and then retreating back into their caves and bunkers to weather the return fire and persistent U.S. bombing raids. To compound the situation for the coalition troops, U.S. commanders initially underestimated the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces as a last isolated pocket of dead-enders numbering less than 200. It turned out that the guerillas number over 1,000, perhaps as high as 5,000 according to some estimates, and that they were receiving reinforcements.
By March 6, eight Americans and seven Afghan soldiers had been killed and reportedly 400 opposing forces had also been killed in the fighting. The coalition casualties stemmed from a friendly fire incident that killed one soldier, the downing of two helicopters by rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire that killed seven soldiers, and the pinning down of U.S. forces being inserted into what was coined as "Objective Ginger" that resulted in dozens of wounded. Ground fire from Afghan militia and American forces in a number of skirmishes, along with heavy aerial bombardment, resulted in over 400 al-Qaeda and Taliban rebels killed, according to U.S. estimates. However, fewer than 50 bodies were ever found. Regardless of the correct number of guerillas killed, it is clear that several hundred somehow escaped the dragnet and melted away, almost certainly by moving in small groups along mountain trails to the tribal areas across the border into Pakistan. The Pakistani forces meant to serve as a blocking forces apparently lacked either the will or the capability, or possibly both, to seal off the border.
Post-Anaconda operations
Following the battle at Shahi-Kot, it is believed that the al-Qaeda fighters established sanctuaries among tribal protectors in Pakistan, from which they regained their strength and later began launching cross-border raids on U.S. forces by the summer months of 2002. Guerilla units, numbering between 5 and 25 men, still regularly cross the border from their sanctuaries in Pakistan to fire rockets at U.S. bases and ambush American convoys and patrols, as well as Afghan National Army troops, Afghan militia forces working with the U.S-led coalition, and non-governmental organizations. The area around the U.S. base at Shkin in Paktika province has seen some of the heaviest activity.
Meanwhile, Taliban forces continued to remain in hiding in the rural regions of the four southern provinces that formed their heartland, Kandahar, Zabul, Helmand, and Uruzgan. In the wake of Operation Anaconda the Pentagon requested that British Royal Marines who are highly trained in mountain warfare, be deployed. They conducted a number of missions over several weeks with very limited results. The Taliban, who during the summer of 2002 numbered in the hundreds, avoided combat with U.S. forces and their Afghan allies as much as possible and melted away into the caves and tunnels of remote Afghan mountain ranges or across the border into Pakistan during operations. This resulted in a number of fruitless missions conducted by American and British forces, in which no combat occurred and no enemy forces were captured or killed. Even with popular support (and it is not certain to what extent the coalition has obtained it), and advanced surveillance technology, locating small bands of 5-10 men in the vast stretches of rugged terrain that exist in southeastern Afghanistan and along the Pakistani border, and who are determined to avoid contact, is an almost impossible task. This rather frustrating situation persisted throughout 2002.
Renewed Taliban insurgency
After managing to evade U.S. forces throughout the summer of 2002, the remnants of the Taliban gradually began to regain their confidence and started to begin preparations to launch the insurgency that Mullah Muhammad Omar had promised during the Taliban's last days in power. During September, Taliban forces began a recruitment drive in Pashtun areas in both Afghanistan and Pakistan to launch a renewed "jihad" or holy war against the Afghan government and the U.S-led coalition. Pamphlets distributed in secret during the night also began to appear in many villages in the former Taliban heartland in southeastern Afghanistan that called for jihad. Small mobile training camps were established along the border with Pakistan by al-Qaeda and Taliban fugitives to train new recruits in guerilla warfare and terrorist tactics, according to Afghan sources and a United Nations report. Most of the new recruits were drawn from the madrassas or religious schools of the tribal areas of Pakistan, from which the Taliban had originally arisen. Major bases, a few with as many as 200 men, were created in the mountainous tribal areas of Pakistan by the summer of 2003. Slipping across the long and rugged border in small groups is a relatively simple task, even with heavy patrolling by security forces. The will of the Pakistani paramilitaries stationed at border crossings to prevent such infiltration was called into question, and Pakistani military operations proved of little use.
The Taliban gradually reorganized and reconstituted their forces over the winter, preparing for a summer offensive. They established a new mode of operation: gather into groups of around 50 to launch attacks on isolated outposts and convoys of Afghan soldiers, police, or militia and then breaking up into groups of 5-10 men to evade subsequent offensives. U.S. forces in the strategy were attacked indirectly, through rocket attacks on bases and improvised mines planted in the roadside. To coordinate the strategy, Mullah Omar named a 10-man leadership council for the resistance, with himself at the head. Five operational zones were created, assigned to various Taliban commanders such as the key Taliban leader Mullah Dadullah, in charge of Zabul province operations. Al-Qaeda forces in the east had a bolder strategy of concentrating on the Americans and catching them when they could with elaborate ambushes.
The first sign that Taliban forces were regrouping came on January 28, when a band of 80 fighters allied with the Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami were discovered and assaulted by U.S. forces at the Adi Ghar cave complex 15 miles (24 km) north of Spin Boldak. 18 rebels were reported killed and no U.S. casualties reported. The site was suspected to be a base to funnel supplies and fighters from Pakistan. The first isolated attacks by relatively large Taliban bands on Afghan targets also appeared around that time.
As the summer continued, the attacks gradually increased in frequency in the "Taliban heartland." Dozens of Afghan government soldiers, non-governmental organization and humanitarian workers, and several U.S. soldiers died in the raids, ambushes, and rocket attacks. In addition to the guerilla attacks, Taliban fighters began building up their forces in the district of Dai Chopan, a district in Zabul province that also straddles Kandahar and Uruzgan and is at the very center of the Taliban heartland. Dai Chopan district is a remote and sparsely populated corner of southeastern Afghanistan composed of towering, rocky mountains interspersed with thin gorges. Taliban fighters decided it would be the perfect area to make a stand against the Afghan government and the coalition forces. Over the course of the summer, perhaps the largest concentration of Taliban militants gathered in the area since the fall of the regime, with up to 1,000 guerillas regrouping. Over 220 people, including several dozen Afghan police, were killed in August of 2003 as Taliban fighters gained strength. The U.S. military is currently sustaining approximately one death and four wounded per week in Afghanistan. One of the major reasons that U.S. forces are suffering such light casualities as compared to Iraq is that they have a much lighter presence in Afghanistan. The American strategy was never to mould Afghanistan as a model of Jeffersonian democracy but rather more narrow. Their strategy was to kill or capture Osama bin Laden and destroy Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The "light touch" strategy while helping to keep casualities low has also prevented the capture of Osama bin-Laden and thus can be considered a failure. The failure in Afghanistan has demonstrated the folly of network centric warfare where wars are won through high technology and not boots on the ground. The U.S. military depended on the Northern Alliance, Mercernary Warlords for ground assault and the Pakistani army for a blocking movement preventing Al-Qaeda and Taliban escape. Unfortunately for the U.S. the interests of Pakistan and the Northern Alliance did not perfectly allign with the U.S. There was no significant blocking force by the Pakistani military across the border. The warlords were easily bribed by Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces and the Northern Alliance was more interested in consolidating their new found gains. For any chance of success the U.S. military needed 20,000 troops for the blocking force across the Pakistani border and a further 10,000 troops for the assault on Tora-Bora.
U.S and Afghan government forces, meanwhile, were preparing an offensive to root out the rebel forces. During the last week of August, Afghan government forces backed by U.S troops and heavy American aerial bombardment advanced upon Taliban positions within the mountain fortress. After a one-week battle, Taliban forces were routed with up to 124 fighters (according to Afghan government estimates) killed. Taliban spokesmen, however, denied the high casualty figure and U.S estimates were somewhat lower. By the first week of September, however, Taliban forces had been scattered from their base at Dai-Chopan.
Psychological Warfare
According to an Australian TV report, the United States is applying psychological pressure to force enemy Taliban fighters out into the open. Members of the 173rd Airborne burned Taliban bodies which had been laid out to face Mecca. Many Muslims would find this to be offensive to them, which could detract from their fighting effectiveness.
Psyops specialist Sgt. Jim Baker was recorded reading out an inflammatory message to the Taliban:
"Attention, Taliban, you are all cowardly dogs. You allowed your fighters to be laid down facing west and burned. You are too scared to retrieve their bodies. This just proves you are the lady boys we always believed you to be."
Another soldier stated:
"You attack and run away like women. You call yourself Talibs but you are a disgrace to the Muslim religion and you bring shame upon your family. Come and fight like men instead of the cowardly dogs you are."
U. S. authorities were to investigate the incident which may have contravened the Geneva convention.
Nature of the coalition
The first wave of attacks was carried out solely by American and British forces. On the second day, only American forces participated. In addition to the United Kingdom, a number of other countries provided support. Although undoubtedly of practical value, in some cases it is generally seen as primarily a moral statement. In rough order of level of contribution, these were:
- Canada: about 2,500 troops, six ships and six aircraft. Since 9/11, more than 15,000 Canadian personnel have served in Afghanistan and the Gulf. Twenty Ships have been deployed to date. An Air Base is also maintained in the Persian Gulf. Sources say that only 40 JTF2 Commandoes were deployed in the initial stages of the war. However, a far larger number is currently present in Afghanistan.
- Australia: about 300 SAS troops, air-to-air refueling tankers, Navy frigates, two Orion electronic intelligence gathering aircraft, and F/A-18 fighter aircraft for Diego Garcia.
- United Kingdom (Operation Veritas): The naval element consisted of one aircraft carrier, one amphibious ship, one destroyer, one frigate, three nuclear fleet submarines and seven Royal Fleet Auxiliaries, SBS and No. 40 Commando (not deployed). The British Army provided the 22nd SAS and later 1,800 troops to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
- New Zealand: 50 Special Air Service soldiers, two C-130 Hercules.
- France (opération Héraclès) :~ 4,500 troops including 3,500 for the Marine Nationale (one CVBG), 600 for the Armée de l'Air) (~ 12 Mirage 2000, Mirage F1 and Mirage IV), 600 to International Security Assistance Force; ~ 200 special forces for 2003.
- Germany: approximately 2,250 troops including special forces, naval vessels, NBC cleanup teams.
- Russia
- Italy
- The Netherlands
- Croatia, 50 military police in Kabul area. From 2006 will become 159.
- Denmark: Special Forces and a C-130 transport aircraft. Six F-16 fighters were later deployed in the EPAF force.
- Norway: six F-16 fighters, logistic teams, mine clearance teams, a special forces commando group and several C-130 transports.
- Bahrain: Naval vessels.
- Jordan
- Japan, in its first military deployment since World War II, contributed naval support for non-combat reinforcement of the operation.
- Romania: 25 military police and a C-130 transport aircraft.
- Note: this list is currently incomplete and almost certainly inaccurate (many countries refuse to specify the whereabouts of their elite combat units and so forth)'
Despite reluctance in the Arab states towards retaliation against the al-Qaida network in Afghanistan, the Pakistani leader General Pervez Musharraf offered support. Pakistan and Iran agreed to open borders to receive the expected increased migration of refugees from Afghanistan. Earlier, Pakistan had supported the Taliban, especially during the 1996-1998 period when they were establishing control- later relations between the two were not as close. After the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan allocated three airbases to the United States for the invasion of Afghanistan. Uzbekistan has allowed the U.S. to place troops on the ground as well as use an airfield for humanitarian relief. 34 nations participate in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for Afghanistan. [5]
Casualties of the invasion
- Main article: Coalition Casualties in Afghanistan
- Main article: List of casualties of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan
According to Jonathan Steele of The Guardian between 20,000 and 49,600 people may have died of the consequences of the invasion. According to Marc W. Herold's Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States' Aerial Bombing at least 3700 and probably closer to 5000 civilians were killed as a result of US bombing[6]. Herold's study omitted those killed indirectly, when air strikes cut off their access to hospitals, food or electricity. Also exempt were bomb victims who later died of their injuries. When there were different casualty figures from the same incident, in 90% of cases Professor Herold chose a lower figure.
Some people, however, dispute Herold's estimates. Joshua Muravchik of the American Enterprise Institute and Carl Conetta of the Project on Defense Alternatives question Herold's heavy use of the Afghan Islamic Press (the Taliban's official mouthpiece) and claim tallies provided them were suspicious. A contrary view is that the Taliban would have been motivated to downplay casualties. Conetta also claims statistical errors in Herold's study[7] [8]. Conetta's study puts total civilian casualties between 1000 and 1300 [9]. A Los Angeles Times study put the number of collateral dead between 1,067 and 1,201.
Diplomatic efforts
Meetings of various Afghan leaders were organised by the United Nations and took place in Germany. The Taliban was not included. These meetings produced an interim government and an agreement to allow a United Nations peacekeeping force to enter Afghanistan.
Humanitarian efforts
It is estimated that in Afghanistan there are 1.5 million suffering from immediate starvation, as well as 7.5 million suffering as a result of the country's dire situation - the combination of civil war, drought-related famine, and, to a large extent, the Taliban's oppressive regime.
In Pakistan, the United Nations and private humanitarian organisations have begun gearing up for the massive humanitarian effort necessary in addition to the already major refugee and food efforts. The United Nations World Food Programme temporarily suspended activities within Afghanistan at the beginning of the bombing attacks. The efforts have, as of early (December 2001), resumed with a daily distribution rate of 3,000 tons a day. It is however estimated that 30,000 tons of food will be needed by (January 2002) to provided sufficient relief to the impoverished masses.
By November 1, U.S. C-17s flying at 30,000 feet (10,000 m) had dropped 1,000,000 food and medicine packets marked with an American flag. Doctors Without Borders called it an act of transparent propaganda and said that using medicines without medical consultation is much more likely to cause harm than good. Action Against Hunger head of operations in Afghanistan Thomas Gonnet said it was an "act of marketing". A further dangerous problem lies in the fact that the food packets are bright yellow in color; the same color as unexploded bomblets from U.S. cluster bombs. Some injuries and damage to housing also occurred from boxes of relief supplies dropped from U.S. aircraft.
Allegations of human rights abuses
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The Dasht-i-Leili massacre allegedly occurred in December, 2001, when a number (disputed to be between 250 and 3,000) of Taliban prisoners were shot or suffocated to death in metal truck containers while being transferred by U.S. and Northern Alliance soldiers from Kunduz to Sheberghan prison in northern Afghanistan [10]. These claims are disputed by journalist Robert Young Pelton, who was present at the time of the incident [11].
There are allegations that coalition soldiers tortured prisoners in interrogations; many complaints center on the U.S. prison camp at Camp X-Ray at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba [12].
Abdul Wali died on June 21, 2003, at a base near Asadabad. He was brutally beaten by former Army Ranger and CIA contractor David Passaro, who was arrested on June 17, 2004, on four counts of assault [13].
In 2004, the US-based human rights organisation Human Rights Watch released a report entitled 'Enduring Freedom - Abuses by US Forces in Afghanistan', containing multiple allegations of abuse by American forces.
In February 2005, the American Civil Liberties Union released documents they had obtained from the United States Army which showed that, following the Abu Ghraib scandal, the Army in Afghanistan had destroyed photographs which documented the abuse of prisoners in their custody. Pictures were taken in the area of Fire Base Tycze, and around the villages of Gurjay and Sukhagen. The pictures were alleged to have shown soldiers posing with hooded and bound detainees during mock executions.
See also: Bagram torture and prisoner abuse and Movement to impeach George W. Bush.
Protests, demonstrations and rallies
Main article: Protests against the invasion of Afghanistan
Several small protests occurred in various cities and college campuses across the United States and in other countries in the first days after the start of the bombing campaign. These were mainly peaceful but larger protests and general strikes occurred in Pakistan, a previous Taliban ally. Some of these were suppressed by police with casualties among the protesters. In both Islamic and non-Islamic nations, protests and rallies of various sizes against the attack on Afghanistan took place.
Many protesters felt that the attack on Afghanistan was unjustified aggression. Some believed it would lead to the deaths of many innocent people by preventing humanitarian aid workers from bringing food into the country.
On October 7, there was a peace rally of 10,000 to 12,000 people in New York City. They marched from Union Square to Times Square, cheering the police at the beginning of the march. The list of about twelve speakers was cut to three or four by the police, and they were herded at the end into a one-lane-wide "bullpen".
There was also a demonstration in London that organisers estimate was 100,000 people.
Disputable information and rumors
Coded messages in Osama bin Laden tapes
- The U.S. government requested that national media not air or check with the federal government first, before airing pre-recorded messages from Osama bin Laden. The reasons they gave were that bin Laden may be sending coded messages within the tapes (steganography), and that the airing of such propaganda was inadvisable. The networks stated that they would review the tapes before airing them.
Slogans and terms
- US Government:
- Operation Enduring Freedom
- War on Terror
- Yahoo: "Allied Strikes"
- CNN: "America Strikes Back", "America's New War"
- MSNBC: "America Strikes Back"
- ABC: "America Strikes"
- NBC: "Taliban Attacked"
- New York Times: "America Attacks" & "A Nation Challenged"
2001 U.S. Attack on Afghanistan -- Timeline
See also: Afghanistan timeline, Invasions of Afghanistan, History of Afghanistan since 1992
Footnotes
Note 1: The U.S. military campaign, was led by U.S. general Tommy Franks, was initially given the name Operation Infinite Justice but quickly renamed Operation Enduring Freedom, due to objections from U.S. and Afghan Muslim clerics of religious connotations —that only God could dispense "infinite justice." British military operations against Afghanistan were codenamed "Operation Veritas."
See also
- List of casualties of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan
- Afghanistan friendly fire incident
- 2003 invasion of Iraq
