Peleliu
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Peleliu (or Beliliou) is an island in the island nation of Palau. Peleliu forms, along with two small islands to its northeast, one of the sixteen states of Palau. It is located northeast of Angaur and southwest of Koror.
Peleliu has a total area of 13 km² (5 mi²) As of 2004, its population was about 700, making it the third most populous state of Palau. Most of the island's population lives in the village of Kloulklubed on the northern coast. This is the capital of Peleliu.
The island was the site of the Battle of Peleliu in World War II. Peleliu is a memorial site for both WWII US and Japanese troops. Many Marines died on the beaches and in the caves of Peleliu. Many of the military installations of the era, such as the airstrip, are still intact, and shipwrecks from the battle remain visible underwater just off the coast. A US Navy ship USS Peleliu is named for the battle.
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The American assault on Peleliu, in the Palau Islands, had the highest casualty rate of any amphibious invasion in terms of men and material in the entire war in the Pacific. Peleliu was viewed as a potential threat to General Douglas MacArthur's invasion of the Philippines; its airfield would enable Japanese planes to strike at American landing and support ships and menace troops once on the ground in the Philippines. Clearly, from MacArthur's perspective, the almost 11,000-man garrison there had to be eliminated before his forces could move, unhindered, on his primary target. Thus, the strategic legitimacy of the Peleliu operation was established. American amphibious doctrine – well-developed and tested from operations from the Gilberts to the Marianas – was up to the task, as well. The 1st Marine Division, a veteran of the Pacific theater, was also ready. Peleliu, however, proved to be quite different from the many previous battles in several fundamental ways, and would end with a high death toll, questionable strategic gain, and yet valuable insights for future operations.
American efforts to take back control of the Pacific and Eastern Asia from the Japanese effectively began with the Battle of the Coral Sea, and the pace of events had quickened significantly by the end of 1942. By that point, American land forces were committed in the Solomon Islands and in New Guinea, and factories back home were hard at work producing the vast fleet that would give America the reach and power to strike at multiple Japanese holdings by the end of 1943. A debate, however, raged at the highest levels of American decision-making, primarily between the army and the navy, as embodied by General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz, respectively. This debate was centered on the overall strategic approach to the war in the Pacific, and whether the approach to Japan should be made through the south, working from New Guinea to the Philippines, then on to mainland China, or through the Central Pacific, ranging from island chain to island chain, directly toward Japan itself. Both strategies had merit, and both were tenaciously championed by their proponents.
The United States, with its vast industrial and manpower base, was able to afford both strategies: MacArthur would fight his way across New Guinea and toward his dream of liberating the Philippines, and Nimitz would work his way across the Central Pacific, using the many tiny island chains there as operational stepping stones toward his goal. Peleliu, in strategic terms, was something of the midpoint between what would end up being this two-pronged approach.
The Palaus, east of the Philippines and southeast of the Marianas, were on the frontier between the advanced stages of these two American strategies, and thus would draw from one to support the other. In the months leading up to the attack, Nimitz's push through the Central Pacific had reached the Marianas and secured them after hard fighting on Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. These operations, launched in succession, had each taken longer than expected due to fierce Japanese resistance; the entire effort in the Marianas, therefore, had lasted into late August 1944.
American forces in the Southwest Pacific, meanwhile, spent the summer of 1944 securing the rest of New Guinea, a task that began with Operation CARTWHEEL in 1943. MacArthur, whose most important objective had always been the liberation of the Philippines, was now poised to launch the preliminary phases of that massive operation. First, however, he believed that the Palaus must be occupied. In addition to removing the threat posed by the Japanese airstrip and garrison to his invasion fleet, the U.S. would gain a seemingly valuable airbase to use in support of operations in the Philippines.
The first official steps taken toward what would eventually be the invasion of Peleliu began in May 1944 when Nimitz "issued a warning order for the invasion of the Palau Islands group under the codename Operation STALEMATE...[the invasion date was] set for 8 September 1944."(1) As the next logical target in the progression across the Central Pacific, the Palaus, at the distant western edge of the Caroline Islands, were home to almost 30,000 Japanese troops and 10,000 Korean and Okinawan laborers as of summer 1944.(2) These troops were spread over several of the many islands in the group, with some on the large island of Babelthuap, others on Yap, some 350 miles to the northeast, and some on Koror, also to the north of Peleliu. The Japanese 14th Division, which comprised the bulk of troops in the Palaus, was based on Koror, and commanded by LG Inoue Sadao. The division, transferred to the Palaus only in April 1944, was a veteran of several combat tours in Manchuria. Optimized for combat on the Pacific islands, the division's three regiments each had enough organic artillery and support elements to enable them to operate virtually independently of one another.
Colonel Nakagawa Kunio, commander of the reinforced 2nd Infantry Regiment of the 14th Division, was charged with preparing the defenses of Peleliu; his troops worked through summer 1944 at their task. Up to summer 1944, the Japanese had chosen to defend most other islands by arranging the bulk of their forces along the beaches, in order to break up American landings. In keeping with the accepted doctrine of favoring the attack over the defense, the Japanese sought to prepare defenses such that they would be able to move over to the offensive as quickly as possible, when the opportunity arose. According to a then-classified U.S. War Department manual entitled Handbook on Japanese Military Forces, dated 1 October 1944, "tactical doctrine insists vigorously on the inherent superiority of the offense, and [regulations] state that the offensive should be resolutely taken."(3) Although this is dated 16 days after the Peleliu invasion was launched, it is not reasonable to believe that any significant insights from that operation would have found their way into the manual, considering that it was update of a 1942 volume, and had been in the works for quite some time.
In any case, the Japanese had thus far favored the offensive so greatly that, in fact, although Japanese training manuals contained "the usual admonitions against a frontal assault"(4) it was quite common for commanders to opt for this tactic in situations which American leaders would have chosen a defensive posture. This was the sort of tactical behavior to which American leaders and troops had become accustomed since the first, frenzied banzai charges at Guadalcanal, two years before.
At Tarawa, in November 1943, the Japanese had defended at the water's edge, and resorted to frontal charges before they were defeated. Similar attacks took place throughout New Guinea, and recently in the Marshall Islands. The overall defensive methodology encountered by the Americans by late 1944 was typified by strong, but shallow, coastal defenses, enemy troops who could be expected to infiltrate through the lines wherever possible, and enemy commanders who would casually (by American standards) employ frontal assaults.
Nimitz, therefore, ordered the planning of an invasion expected to be very much like others fought, and won, over the last year. STALEMATE II, as the operation was eventually designated after some changes, would take place on 15 September 1944, with landings first at Peleliu, and subsequent assaults on Anguar and Ulithi, also in the Palaus. American amphibious doctrine had been refined and improved upon over a year of hard fighting, beginning with Tarawa, and was approaching the efficiency of a well-oiled machine by late 1944. Land-based targets would be destroyed by massive naval fires, lasting days, and the landings themselves would be immediately preceded by strafing and bombing runs by carrier-based aircraft. The troops would be carried to shore in successive waves, massing on the beaches until they had sufficient force to push inland. The shallow Japanese defenses, although held with vigor, would eventually be overwhelmed, and American troops would move and capture the island. Although fighting in the Marianas had been tougher than expected, this overall methodology worked, and would be employed again at Peleliu.
While U.S. doctrine had evolved greatly, it seemed, from the American perspective, that the Japanese were incapable of adapting their tactics. In almost all island defenses, they had exacted high casualty rates from the Americans, but in the end suffered, effectively, 100% casualties, of which generally 99% were killed. Offensive-minded dogma seemed to overrule any pragmatic good sense.
Japanese tactics, however, were undergoing a significant transformation, a change as of yet unknown to the Americans. Conscious of their loss of strategic and operational initiative, and the loss of the entire eastern portion of their sphere of control, the Japanese had drawn their final 'line in the sand,' a construct referred to as the "Absolute National Defense Zone."(5) In order to hold this line, the Imperial General Headquarters directed that island defenses were to be conducted in such a manner that American forces would be bogged down and bled white over long periods of time, in hopes of bringing about a negotiated end to the war.(6) Bloody but short-lived banzai charges could not be sustained long enough to exact such casualties; therefore, changes needed to be made in how the Japanese were to defend their islands. If such changes could be instituted, and they worked, it was believed that the Americans simply would not have the stomach for such attrition-heavy warfare.
COL Nakagawa planned to use what were later referred to as fukakku tactics, which would make use of well-entrenched soldiers, caves, natural barriers on and off the island, and vast underground positions honeycombed throughout his area of operations. The terrain of Peleliu was perfectly suited to this approach, with dense undergrowth, sharp coral and rock outcroppings near the most likely invasion beaches, and a coral reef surrounding the entire island. Additionally, other beaches were less likely as landing sites due to difficult terrain features on or immediately inland of them. Finally, and most significantly, the northern reaches of Peleliu were dominated by a series of steep and craggy ridge lines and hills, known as the Umurbrogol Mountains. At 500 hundred feet about sea level, the highest peak held a commanding view of the island, to include the airfield to the south.
Throughout the many hills, draws, small valleys, and crags of the Umurbrogols, the Japanese blasted caves of varying sizes, from those so small they could only fit a few men, to one large enough to host 1000.(7) From these caves Nakagawa's men sited their weapons, to include 20 81mm mortars, 20mm automatic guns, and 4 150mm mortars. These were in addition to a light tank unit, consisting of fewer than 20 tanks, an antiaircraft detachment, and the normal compliment of rifles and grenades adequate to arm the almost 11,000 Japanese.(8) Along the beaches were arrayed thousands of obstacles and munitions, as well, to include many heavy artillery shells, buried upright with their fuses exposed in order to detonate when run over, in the same manner as a standard anti-tank mine. COL Nakagawa planned to fight a delaying action along the beaches, essentially sacrificing a battalion worth of troops there; the real battle, and the attrition, would take place inland once American troops were fully committed to the island.
While the Japanese were planning and constructing their defenses on Peleliu, the 1st Marine Division was busy planning their attack. Other operations in the Palau Islands would involve the army's green 81st Infantry Division, commanded by MG Paul Mueller; additionally, the 81st would serve as a possible reserve for MG William Rupertus' 1st MarDiv, should they be needed. The American plan was more or less identical to those successful attacks launched over the previous year. Beaches on the southwestern corner of the island were chosen, mainly due to their proximity to the airfield. A pre-invasion naval bombardment was scheduled to last 2 days, and involve several battleships and cruisers. When ground commanders complained that this was too short, it was extended to three days, but without a corresponding (one would think 50%) increase in ammunition; hence, the bombardment would last three days, albeit with two days' worth of ammunition.
1st MarDiv, during this period of planning, was stationed on Pavuvu, an inadequately small spot of land in the Russell Islands. Intended as a place for rest, reorganization and retraining for the tired division, it ended up providing little opportunity for any of these. Forced to construct their own camps on the barren island during time that would have been better used for combat training, the marines were also re-equipped piecemeal, with new weapons and vehicles coming to them in fits and spurts, even up to the days before their departure for the long sea voyage to Peleliu.
When the marines arrived in the Palaus in September, just before D-Day, they witnessed yet another of the navy's massive bombardments, even if for only 3 days. Tiny Peleliu, described as being mostly low and flat by aerial photograph analysts, and only about 6 square miles in size, was battered by shells from the old battleships and cruisers, strafed by carrier planes, and finally pummeled by rockets launched from landing vessels immediately before the first troops stormed ashore. The noise was nearly deafening, the smoke thick, and the entire spectacle awesome, as such bombardments generally were. The few Japanese planes on the island were destroyed, as were most of the buildings around the airfield. During the naval fire on D-Day alone, some 1400 tons of ammunition were rained down on exposed and suspected Japanese positions.(9) In fact, believing the fires to be so devastating and effective, Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf, declared that he had "run out of profitable targets."(10)
Only two minutes off schedule, on 15 September 1944, the first troops began landing at 0832, with the 1st Marines on the far left, 5th Marines in the middle, and 7th Marines on the right (southern) end of the beaches.(11) The regiments on the flanks were to move inland and wheel outward, while the 5th Marines was to push across the airfield to the eastern side of the island. Should this be accomplished as planned, the entire southern end of the island – better than half the entire land mass – would be in American hands, and the rest of the operation would be over quickly. Rupertus, apparently brimming with confidence in his men and himself, declared that Peleliu would be taken by the 1st MarDiv in only a few days.
The Japanese, during the Navy's bombardment and Rupertus' blustering, had hunkered down in their caves, bunkers, pillboxes, and trenches, waited out the preliminary fires, and then assumed their well-protected, well-hidden positions. Compared to earlier island assaults, few Japanese were arrayed directly opposite the beaches. Most were just inland, on the flanks of the beaches, and in the steep mountains immediately north of the airfield. COL Nakagama's troops demonstrated a great deal of discipline in not firing wildly at landing craft while they were far out to sea, and in doing so reveal their positions to naval fire. During the 3 day bombardment, they also held their fire for the same reason. Consequently, the vast majority of positions, and virtually all those holding heavy weapons, were unscathed as of D-Day.
Only two minutes off schedule, on 15 September 1944, the first troops began landing at 0832, with the 1st Marines on the far left, 5th Marines in the middle, and 7th Marines on the right (southern) end of the beaches.11 The regiments on the flanks were to move inland and wheel outward, while the 5th Marines was to push across the airfield to the eastern side of the island. Should this be accomplished as planned, the entire southern end of the island – better than half the entire land mass – would be in American hands, and the rest of the operation would be over quickly. Rupertus, apparently brimming with confidence in his men and himself, declared that Peleliu would be taken by the 1st MarDiv in only a few days.
The Japanese, during the Navy's bombardment and Rupertus' blustering, had hunkered down in their caves, bunkers, pillboxes, and trenches, waited out the preliminary fires, and then assumed their well-protected, well-hidden positions. Compared to earlier island assaults, few Japanese were arrayed directly opposite the beaches. Most were just inland, on the flanks of the beaches, and in the steep mountains immediately north of the airfield. COL Nakagama's troops demonstrated a great deal of discipline in not firing wildly at landing craft while they were far out to sea, and in doing so reveal their positions to naval fire. During the 3 day bombardment, they also held their fire for the same reason. Consequently, the vast majority of positions, and virtually all those holding heavy weapons, were unscathed as of D-Day.
For the marines, things did not go according to plan. Despite the seemingly massive naval fires, skilled air support, and their undisputed bravery under fire, the attack soon bogged down. 1st Marines suffered the most, finding themselves facing a 30-foot high coral ridge. Japanese gunners swept the marines' positions on both the northern and southern ends of the beach, and only the 5th Marines, in the middle, made any real progress in the first hours of the assault, reaching the eastern side of the island by 1500 on D-Day; 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines was the first to reach the eastern shore, thus cutting off Japanese defenders to the south.
The Japanese also displayed even more uncharacteristic discipline by not resorting to a drunken banzai attack, or other uncoordinated, wasteful actions. Late in the afternoon a semi-coordinated tank and infantry attack, launched from the north side of the airfield, took place, involving somewhere between 11 and 17(12) tanks and an unknown number of infantrymen. Although more coordinated than the standard frontal charge, the tanks dashed ahead of the unprotected infantry, who were quickly cut down and dispersed. The tanks, meanwhile, were destroyed by marine tanks and anti-tank gunners. Still, before sunset on D-Day, it was quite apparent that 1st MarDiv was facing an enemy that was not playing by the rules established thus far in the Pacific.
Both 1st and 7th Marines experienced punishing enfilade fire, while 5th Marines tried hard to keep contact with its brother regiments as it moved across the airfield. D-Day ended with, overall, little divisional progress, and heavier casualties than expected. MG Rupertus landed on the morning of D+1 to take personal command of the operation, but was hampered early on by poor communications with outlying units; he had no clear picture of the casualties in 1st or 7th Marines, and equally unclear information about their current tactical situations. Additionally, Rupertus had broken his ankle in an earlier training accident, and was thus unable to easily move to his forward units to see the situation personally.
Over the next week, 1st Marines pushed forward, during which time it reached the base of what became known as 'Bloody Nose Ridge,' a large coral ridge line that overlooked the airfield, and on which the Japanese had entrenched numerous mortars and fighting positions. 1st Marines engaged "in some of the most vicious and costly fighting of the entire Pacific campaign"(13) during this 8-day period, suffering almost 50% casualties along the way. On D+2, MG Rupertus, despite the slow going on his division's flanks and the mounting casualties in 1st Marines, informed III Amphibious Corps, in charge of the overall attack in the Palaus, that the situation was well in hand and would, again, be over within days. This gave the green light for the 81st ID to begin its operations on the islands of Anguar and Ulithi, both secondary objectives in the Palau campaign. Although Rupertus had committed his entire division, including his two reserve battalions on D-Day, he insisted that his division alone could, and would, take Peleliu; the marines did not need a fresh army division to help them.
5th and 7th Marines, up to D+8, reached their objectives of securing the airfield and southern portion of the island. A damaged navy torpedo bomber was the first American plane to land, and did so on D+3;(14) thereafter, on 24 September, marine fighter aircraft began landing on Peleliu. Until the marines established their airbase on Peleliu, close and deep air support was provided entirely by carrier-based aircraft under the direction of the navy. Although 1st MarDiv's artillery was landed on D+2, extensive use of land and carrier-based air support was made throughout the battle.
While the marines fought for every inch of ground on Peleliu, the army's 81st ID made relatively quick work of Anguar and Ulithi; in fact, no enemy troops were found on the latter of the two islands, and relatively light casualties were sustained in taking the former. Meanwhile, 1st Marines, under COL Lewis B. 'Chesty' Puller, continued to bleed, and be admonished to keep up the fight by MG Rupertus, still stubbornly clinging to the notion that Peleliu would be secured in only a few more days. When MG Roy Geiger, III Amphibious Corps Commander, went ashore on 21 September to get a first-hand look at the invasion, he was dismayed by the lack of progress and high casualty count. He asked MG Rupertus if he needed support, in the form of army units now wrapping up their operations on Anguar, but Rupertus demurred. After what has been reported as a heated discussion,(15) Geiger informed Rupertus that one regimental combat team (RCT) of the 81st ID would be joining 1st MarDiv as soon as possible. The 321st RCT would land on Peleliu on 23 September and "relieve Puller's remnants."(16)
During the next week of fighting, the marines and army together reached the northern end of the island and made a small, successful amphibious assault on the islet of Ngesebus, where there was an enemy airfield still under construction. In reaching and securing northern Peleliu, American forces accomplished two vital goals. First, they cut off the Japanese garrison on Peleliu from any hope of seaborne reinforcement or resupply from the northern islands of Koror and Babelthuap. Second, they succeeded in completely surrounding the rugged Umurbrogol Mountains, where the last Japanese defenders were entrenched. The Japanese on those northern islands did attempt to reinforce Nakagama's command, twice sending barges down from Koror; although about 600 additional troops did reach Peleliu, they did so without most of their equipment, their small convoy having fallen victim to American air attacks.
The Umurbrogols now surrounded, the remaining Japanese under COL Nakagawa put up an increasingly stout defense, forcing the Americans to fight for every inch of rough terrain. Flamethrowers, mounted on LVT(4)s and man-portable, were essential to American progress, as were various small demolition charges. The fighting took place in such a small area that marine aircraft, flying from Peleliu's airfield, did not even have time to retract their landing gear before dropping their bombs on the nearby mountains. The fighting on the ground continued, with COL Nakagawa's troops using, to great effect, their massive 150mm mortars(17) and their extensive cave networks.
Throughout this period, Rupertus continued to insist that his marines would secure the island shortly. Like the Japanese throughout the Pacific, however, the enemy on Peleliu fought only harder as their situation became more dire. By early October the pocket of resistance in the Umurbrogol range was reduced to an area of some 900 by 400 yards; the rest of the island was already firmly in American hands. Thus far, American forces had suffered almost 900 killed and 4500 wounded or missing; "of [the] total of 5388 casualties, 5044 were members of the First Marine Division."(18) Despite these massive numbers, and the fact that fighting was still going on in the mountains, on 12 October MG Geiger declared the island itself secured. The battered 1st MarDiv was ordered from the line, to be replaced entirely by elements of the 81st ID. By the third week of October the majority of marines were gone, save for some support troops; the army was left the job of reducing the pocket of defenders in the mountains.
81st ID would employ siege tactics against the last Japanese, completely surrounding and constantly pummeling their defenses with massive air and artillery fires, dangling satchel charges in front of cave openings on cliffs, and eventually using armored bulldozers to collapse cave openings. It would take another 6 weeks, until the end of November, before consistent, organized resistance was ended, and Japanese stragglers were found on the island for years afterward. All told, the Japanese lost about 11,000 men on Peleliu, with only 202 captured throughout the battle; only 19 of these were Japanese, the others being Korean and Okinawan laborers. American forces suffered just over 1500 killed and some 6700 wounded or missing.(19) Regardless, the operational objectives in the Palaus had been reached: Peleliu and its airfield were in American hands, the smaller island of Anguar, also home to an airstrip, had also been seized, and a fleet-sized anchorage had been taken at Ulithi. These accomplishments are clear, and beyond dispute; the means by which they were reached, and the utility of them once seized, however, are.
A number of points of contention are evident during the planning and execution phases of the assault on Peleliu. First, and probably foremost, was the decision to launch the attack at all. Beyond this issue is the actual operational and tactical execution of the attack itself, especially in terms of leadership and organizational preparedness.
At the core of the strategic justification for the attack was MacArthur's insistence that his right flank must be protected, and that seizing the Palaus was the means by which this should be accomplished. Nimitz, for his part, had promised MacArthur the support he might need to return to the Philippines, and agreed with the general's opinion on the Palaus. Without further information, little intelligence could be produced to dispute this assessment; after all, the Palaus did present a gap between the two American axes of advance in the Pacific, and could well serve as a strategic 'shoe horn' the Japanese might use to threaten further moves by either Nimitz or MacArthur.
Admiral William Halsey, commander of the 3rd Fleet, however, reported in late August and early September that enemy resistance in the area of MacArthur's invasion was far less than expected. To this end he recommended, on 12 September, that the landings in the Palaus be canceled entirely and MacArthur's invasion of Leyte be moved up to October.(20) Those forces earmarked for the Palaus – and already at sea – should be used to supplement landings in the Philippines. Although Nimitz and MacArthur accepted Halsey's idea about moving the date for Leyte, they opted to go ahead with the Palau invasions anyway; Nimitz cited the fact that forces were already at sea and it would be too difficult to recall them. Additionally, he argued that Halsey's idea of using carrier and surface forces to isolate the Palaus would be wasteful. Although the absence of such ships might have been felt in later actions, especially the Battle of Leyte Gulf, in point of fact one of Halsey's carriers was not present for that engagement. Still, this is a view afforded only by hindsight, and therefore should not be considered in deciding the overall wisdom of the entire operation.
From the American point of view in summer 1944, and based on available intelligence, the Palaus did represent a threat to further operations. Their proximity to the Philippines and their location between the American axes of advance, coupled with the possibility of their reinforcement directly from Japan, made them a necessary target. Although captured documents and interrogations after the war concluded that the Japanese had no real plan or intention of using the Palaus as such, from an American perspective the threat did exist, and tying down vital surface forces in order to isolate and suppress the islands was not a decisive option; only taking the islands themselves would eliminate the threat completely.
The first step toward seizing Peleliu was the massive pre-invasion naval and air bombardment, and it was executed with the typical noise, smoke, and overestimation of its lethality. Although ignorance of Peleliu's rough terrain and the enemy's skilled use of it precluded the Americans from accurately estimating the effects of the fires, the navy had consistently shown too much confidence in their effectiveness. They had done so in many previous battles, much to the consternation of landing forces. Massive bombardments, although showy, loud, and surely frightening to enemy forces, had yet to reduce an island as completely as the navy asserted they could; why this assertion was again made at Peleliu is beyond understanding. The most recent operations on Guam had demonstrated that a short, however intense, bombardment, did not yield the same results as did a longer one; Peleliu experienced only 3 days of fires before D-Day.(21)
Strategy and preparatory fires aside, it was, the marines' conduct in the taking of the islands where the most critical commentary can and should be aimed. Before going into detail about this, however, it is important to dispel one possible area of fault: aerial photography. Although it was obvious to all those on Peleliu as of the morning of D-Day that the island was not flat and level, as intelligence analysts had insisted, the dense vegetation made impossible any other conclusion but this. The island did appear as had so many others throughout the Pacific: flat along the shores, and slightly hilly inland, with the majority of cover and concealment provided by flora, rather than terrain. There was little that could have been done to avoid this false conclusion about Peleliu, short of conducting extensive reconnaissance missions on the island itself, which was obviously out of the question. Thus, although the marines did face an island that appeared little as it had been described, there was equally little that could have been done to avoid this error. Mistakes are made in war; this was one of the unavoidable ones.
And so finally, it is the conduct of the marines themselves, specifically their leadership, that one must take to task. MG Rupertus was undoubtedly a tough, brave man. He had served ably in Guadalcanal and had been decorated for his leadership there. He had the utmost confidence in his men, their equipment, and his plan. American amphibious doctrine had been working across the Pacific with stunning results over the previous year, and Peleliu would be yet another validation of these methods. In these lies the greatest failing of Rupertus, and the greatest mistake by the marines: overconfidence.
Rupertus continually stated throughout the planning stages that the fight would be intense, but short. It would be a quintessential storm landing, with hard fighting on the beaches and immediately inland, but of short duration once the Japanese lines were pierced. He spoke of 'open season' on the Japanese once they began their inevitable banzai charges, and demanded that "somebody bring me the Jap commander's dress sword."(22) This was arrogance and overconfidence of the highest order, considering stiff enemy resistance continuing on Guam that summer, and the haphazard manner in which 1st MarDiv had trained and loaded for Peleliu. Morale on the part of troops and a commander's confidence are critical to victory, but such specific, bold claims on the part of a commander are irresponsible. Throughout the battle Rupertus, seemingly oblivious to the casualties his division was taking, insisted that the end was in sight, and that outside help was unnecessary. It took an order from his corps commander to get him to remove Puller's 1st Marines from the line, to be replaced by an army unit; Rupertus had repeatedly expressed his lack of confidence in the untried 81st ID, its commander, and the army in general. Apparently, it was a far better decision to sacrifice his own troops rather than take a chance on the army; inter-service rivalry is fine for enlisted men, but at the general officer level it is childish and counterproductive.
In addition to his unwillingness to accept help, Rupertus had planned an invasion for which he held only two battalions as his divisional reserve, with nothing else to back him up should the need arise. Apparently it was inconceivable to him that a situation in which his marines would need help could develop. Consequently, the 81st ID, whose attacks on Anguar and Ulithi were held up pending favorable progress on Peleliu, were launched. This, despite the fact that by D+2, the day Rupertus informed III Amphibious Corps that the 81st was not needed, 1st MarDiv was completely bogged down and suffering horrendous casualties. American intelligence knew that the garrisons on Anguar and Ulithi were smaller than the one on Peleliu, and this was precisely why the attacks on these islands were held off: so that the 81st could provide 1st MarDiv with support if needed first on Peleliu. Rupertus, stubborn to the end, had to be ordered to accept the army's assistance, and even then continued to insist that his marines would take the island shortly. Intermittent problems with water and food supplies,(23) along with stiffening Japanese resistance, and the high temperatures coupled with Rupertus' arrogant stubbornness probably resulted in more deaths than were necessary.
In the end, Peleliu itself provided very little in the way of support for further American operations, although knowledge of and experience against Japanese fukakku tactics were valuable, and would help the Americans deal with similar methods on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. The airfield at tiny Anguar proved far more useful, and the fleet anchorage at Ulithi was used extensively until the end of the war. Still, these latter truths are provided only by hindsight, and should not be used as evidence to invalidate the decisions that led to the attack on Peleliu. What should be considered, then, is how the attack itself was prosecuted, and how the same results, however useful or not, could have been reached with fewer casualties. MG Rupertus, for his overconfidence and arrogance in not planning for any real contingencies or considering the need for assistance, shoulders the lion's share of this responsibility. In the face of empirical battlefield evidence, Rupertus expected too much from his men, and refused ready assistance when offered. Although the official Marine Corps history of the battle states that it validated established amphibious doctrine, that had really already been done throughout the Central Pacific campaign, and needed little more evidence to prove its value. Peleliu exists as a costly battle, one that hindsight encourages us to declare as pointless. Its legitimacy and value was established and supported by the intelligence of the time; the bravery of the American servicemen who fought there is beyond question; therefore only the skill of its execution should be disputed.